

# INTELLIGENT BORDER SECURITY INTRUSION DETECTION USING IOT

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## ABSTRACT

The security of national borders is a critical aspect of any country's defense strategy. Traditional methods of border monitoring are often insufficient to detect intrusions in real-time, especially in vast and remote areas. This paper proposes an intelligent border security intrusion detection system based on the Internet of Things (IoT), which integrates sensors, communication networks, and data analytics to monitor and protect national borders effectively. The proposed system utilizes IoT-enabled devices such as cameras, motion detectors, infrared sensors, and radar systems for continuous monitoring. These devices communicate with a central control system, where advanced machine learning algorithms analyze the collected data to detect and predict potential intrusions. Additionally, the system employs automated decision-making processes, including alerts to security personnel and even autonomous

countermeasures in specific cases. This system aims to improve the efficiency, reliability, and real-time responsiveness of border security operations, significantly reducing the risks associated with manual surveillance. The paper discusses the technical aspects of the system, including hardware components, data processing algorithms, and communication protocols, and evaluates its effectiveness through simulations and real-world testing. Results indicate that the system can detect intrusions with high accuracy and in real-time, providing substantial benefits in terms of border security.

**KEYWORDS:** Border Security, IoT, Intrusion Detection, Real-Time Monitoring, Surveillance, Sensor Networks, Machine Learning, Automated Decision Making, National Defense, Security Systems.

## 1.INTRODUCTION

Internet of Things (IOT) devices are increasingly integrated in cyber physical systems (CPS), including in critical infrastructure sectors such as dams and utility plants. In these settings, IOT devices (also referred to as Industrial IOT or IIOT) are often part of an Industrial Control System (ICS), tasked with the reliable operation of the infrastructure. ICS can be broadly defined to include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and systems that comprise programmable logic controllers (PLC) and Modbus protocols. The connection between ICS or IIOT-based systems with public networks, however, increases their attack surfaces and risks of being targeted by cyber criminals. One high-profile example is the Stuxnet campaign, which reportedly targeted Iranian centrifuges for nuclear enrichment in 2010, causing severe damage to the equipment [1], [2]. Another example is that of the incident targeting a pump that resulted in the failure of an Illinois water plant in 2011 [3]. BlackEnergy3 was another campaign that targeted Ukraine power grids in 2015, resulting in power outage that affected approximately 230,000 people [4]. In April 2018, there were also reports of successful cyber-attacks affecting three U.S. gas

pipeline firms, and resulted in the shutdown of electronic customer communication systems for several days [1]. Although security solutions developed for information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems are relatively mature, they may not be directly applicable to ICSs. For example, this could be the case due to the tight integration between the controlled

physical environment and the cyber systems. Therefore, system-level security methods are necessary to analyze physical behaviour and maintain system operation availability [1]. ICS security goals are prioritized in the order of availability, integrity, and confidentiality, unlike most IT/OT systems (generally prioritized in the order of confidentiality, integrity, and availability) [5]. Due to close coupling between variables of the feedback control loop and physical processes, (successful) cyber-attacks on ICS can result in severe and potentially fatal consequences for the society and our environment. This reinforces the importance of designing extremely robust safety and security measurements to detect and prevent intrusions targeting ICS [1]. Popular attack detection and attribution approaches include those based on signatures and anomalies. To mitigate the known limitations in both

signature-based and anomaly-based detection and attribution approaches, there have been attempts to introduce hybrid based approaches [6]. Although hybrid based approaches are effective at detecting unusual activities, they are not reliable due to frequent network upgrades, resulting in different Intrusion Detection System (IDS) typologies [7]. Beyond this, conventional attack detection and attribution techniques mainly rely on network metadata analysis (e.g. IP addresses, transmission ports, traffic duration, and packet intervals). Therefore, there has been renewed interest in utilizing attack detection and attribution solutions based on Machine Learning (ML) or Deep Neural Networks (DNN) in recent times. In addition, attack detection approaches can be categorized into network-based or host-based approaches. Supervised clustering, single-class or multi-class Support Vector Machine (SVM), fuzzy logic, Artificial Neural Network (ANN), and DNN are commonly used techniques for attack detection in network traffic. These techniques analyze real-time traffic data to detect malicious attacks in a timely manner. However, attack detection that considers only network and host data may fail to detect sophisticated attacks or insider attacks. Unsupervised models that

incorporate process/physical data can complement a system's monitoring since they do not rely on detailed knowledge of the cyber-threats. In general, a sophisticated attacker with sufficient knowledge and time, such as a nation state advanced persistent threat actor, can potentially circumvent robust security solutions. Furthermore, most of the existing approaches ignore the imbalanced property of ICS data by modeling only a system's normal behavior and reporting deviations from normal behavior as anomalies. This is, perhaps, due to limited attack samples in existing datasets and real-world scenarios. Although using majority class samples is a good solution to avoid issues due to imbalanced datasets, the trained model will have no view of the attack samples' patterns. In other words, such an approach fails to detect unseen attacks and suffers from a high false positive rate [8]. Thus, there have been attempts to utilize DL approaches, for example, to facilitate automated feature (representation) learning to model complex concepts from simpler ones [9] without depending on human-crafted features [10]. Motivated by the above observations, this paper presents our proposed novel two stage ensemble deep learning-based attack detection and attack attribution framework for imbalanced ICS

datasets. In the first stage, an ensemble representation learning model combined with a Decision Tree (DT) is designed to detect attacks in an imbalanced environment. Once the attack is detected, several one-vs-all classifiers will ensemble together to form a larger DNN to classify the attack attributes with a confidence interval during the second stage. Moreover, the proposed framework is capable of detecting unseen attack samples. A summary of our approach in this study is as follows: 1) We develop a novel two-phase ensemble ICS attack detection method capable of detecting both previously seen and unseen attacks. We will also demonstrate that the proposed method outperforms other competing approaches in terms of accuracy and f-measure. The proposed deep representation learning results in this method being robust to imbalanced data. 2) We propose a novel self-tuning two-phase attack attribution method that ensembles several deep one-vs-all classifiers using a DNN architecture for reducing false alarm rates. The proposed method can accurately attribute attacks with high similarity. This is the first ML-based attack attribution method in ICS/IIoT at the time of this research. 3) We analyze the computational complexity of the proposed attack detection and attack attribution

framework, demonstrating that despite its superior performance, its computational complexity is similar to that of other DNN-based methods in the literature. The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. Section II will introduce the relevant background and related literature. Section III will describe the proposed framework, followed by the experimental setup in Section IV. In Section V, the evaluation findings based on two real-world ICS datasets demonstrate that the proposed framework outperforms several other systems. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.

## 2. EXISTING SYSTEM

In [11], ML algorithms, such as K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN), Random Forest (RF), DT, Logistic Regression (LR), ANN, Naïve Bayes (NB), and SVM were compared in terms of their effectiveness in detecting backdoor, command, and SQL injection attacks in water storage systems. The comparative summary suggested that the RF algorithm has the best attack detection, with a recall of 0.9744; the ANN is the fifth-best algorithm, with a recall of 0.8718; and the LR is the worstperforming algorithm, with a recall of 0.4744. The authors also reported that the ANN could not detect 12.82% of the

attacks and considered 0.03% of the normal samples to be attacks. In addition, LR, SVM, and KNN considered many attack samples as normal samples, and these ML algorithms are sensitive to imbalanced data. In other words, they are not suitable for attack detection in ICS. In [12], the authors presented a KNN algorithm to detect cyber-attacks on gas pipelines. To minimize the effect of using an imbalanced dataset in the algorithm, they performed oversampling on the dataset to achieve balance.

Using the KNN on the balanced dataset, they reported an accuracy of 97%, a precision of 0.98, a recall of 0.92, and an f-measure of 0.95. In [13], the authors presented a Logical Analysis of Data (LAD) method to extract patterns/rules from the sensor data and use these patterns/rules to design a two-step anomaly detection system. In the first step, a system is classified as stable or unstable, and in the second one, the presence of an attack is determined. They compared the performance of the proposed LAD method with the DNN, SVM, and CNN methods. Based on these experiments, the DNN outperformed the LAD method in the precision metric; however, the LAD performed better in recall and f-measure.

In [14], the authors used the DNN algorithm to detect false data injection attacks in power systems. Findings of their evaluation using two datasets suggested 91.80% accuracy. In [15], the authors proposed an autoencoder-based method to detect false data injection attacks and clean them using denoising autoencoders. Their experiments showed that these methods outperformed the SVM-based method. To handle the effect of imbalanced data on the algorithm, they ignored attack data in training the autoencoder. In [16], the authors presented a technique based on Extreme Learning Machine (ELM) for attack detection in CPS. To address the imbalanced challenge of neural networks, training was conducted using only normal data. Based on these experiments, the proposed ELM-based method outperformed the SVM attack detection method.

### **Disadvantages**

- i. The system is implemented by Conventional Machine Learning.
- ii. The system doesn't implement for analyzing large data sets.

## **3. PROPOSED SYSTEM**

The proposed attack detection consists of two phases, namely representation learning and detection phase. Using a conventional unsupervised DNN on an imbalanced dataset yielded a DNN model that mainly learned majority class patterns and missed minority class characteristics. Most researchers have tried to address this challenge by generating new samples or removing certain samples to make the dataset balanced and then passing the data to a DNN. However, in ICS/IIoT security applications, generating or removing samples are not reasonable solutions. Due to the ICS/IIoT systems' sensitivity, generated samples should be validated in a real network, which is impossible since the generated attack samples may be harmful to the network and cause severe impacts on the environment or human life. In addition, validation of the generated samples is time-consuming.

Moreover, removing the normal data from a dataset is not the right solution since the number of attack samples in ICS/IIoT datasets is usually less than 10% of the dataset, and most of the dataset knowledge is discarded by removing 80% of the dataset. To avoid the above mentioned problems in handling imbalanced datasets, this study proposed a new deep representation learning method to make the DNN able to handle

imbalanced datasets without changing, generating, or removing samples. This model consisted of two unsupervised stacked auto encoders, each responsible for finding patterns from one class. Since each model tries to extract abstract patterns of one class without considering another, the output of that model represented its inputs well. The stacked auto encoders had three decoders and encoders with input and final representation layers. The encoder layers mapped the input representation to a higher, 800-dimensional space, a 400-dimensional space, and the final 16-dimensional space. The system shows the encoder function of an auto encoder. The decoder layers did the opposite and tried to reconstruct the input representation





by starting from the 16-dimensional new representation and mapping it to the 400-dimensional, 800-dimensional, and input representations. Equations 2 shows the decoder function of an auto encoder. These hyper parameters were selected using trial and- error to have the best performance in f-measure with the lowest architectural complexity.

### **Advantages**

- i. The proposed two-phase attack detection component has been implemented.

ii. Unsupervised models that incorporate process/physical data can complement a system's monitoring since they do not rely on detailed knowledge of the cyber-threats.

## 4. OUTPUT SCREENS



## 5. CONCLUSION

This paper proposed a novel two-stage ensemble deep learning-based attack detection and attack attribution framework for imbalanced ICS data. The

attack detection stage uses deep representation learning to map the samples to the new higher dimensional space and applies a DT to detect the attack samples. This stage is robust to imbalanced datasets and capable of detecting previously unseen attacks. The attack attribution stage is an ensemble of several one-vs-all classifiers, each trained on a specific attack attribute. The entire model forms a complex DNN with a partially connected and fully connected component that can accurately attribute cyber attacks, as demonstrated. Despite the complex architecture of the proposed framework, the computational complexity of the training and testing phases are respectively  $O(n^4)$  and  $O(n^2)$ , ( $n$  is the number of training samples), which are similar to those of other DNN-based techniques in the literature. Moreover, the proposed framework can detect and attribute the samples timely with a better recall and f-measure than previous works.

Future extension includes the design of a cyber-threat hunting component to facilitate the identification of anomalies invisible to the detection component for example by building a normal profile over the entire system and the assets.

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